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Communication about property rights is essential to our lives. Property rights
determine fundamental aspects of our behavior, such as where we can walk, live,
and work. For these rights to have meaning, many parties must communicate. For
example, potential buyers, potential trespassers, and authorities must understand
the nature and extent of an owner's property.! This communication involves
costs, like the costs of fencing or of surveying the boundaries of a parcel of land
before constructing a building.2 These costs must be balanced against the benefits
of successful communication, which include the gains from transferring
entitlements3 and the cost reductions of avoiding infringements of property
rights. Prevention of infringement through successful communication may be
cheaper than securing redress for infringed entitlements. For example, if the
boundaries of a parcel of real property are not accurately communicated, an
adjoining owner may construct a building that spans the property line. Even if the
encroachment is small, the misplaced building may have to be demolished.4
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1. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property:'The
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 26 (2000).
2. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 10, 12 (1960).
3. See id at 12.
4. In the case of Baugh v. Bergdoll, a building foundation constructed by the defendant encroached
on the plaintiffs property by six inches beginning at least five feet underground. The defendant claimed
that the trespass was necessary for construction and that the trespassing foundation had actually
strengthened the plaintiffs own foundation. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that these
economic allegations were irrelevant and ruled that "[w]here one intrudes upon the land of another, the
latter has choice of remedies; he may compel a withdrawal of the intruder, or he may regard the
intrusion as a permanent trespass and recover compensatory damages therefor." 76 A. 207, 208 (Pa.
1910); see also Pile v. Pedrick, 31 A. 646, 647 (Pa. 1895) (issuing a similar injunction for the razing of a
foundation that trespassed less than two inches onto plaintiffs property); Ochroch v. Kia-Noury, 497
A.2d 1354, 1356-57 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (holding that economic utility is irrelevant to determining the
appropriateness of an injunction to destroy encroaching construction); Ventresca v. Ventresca, 126 A.2d
515, 518 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1956) (same). But see Yeakel v. Driscoll, 467 A.2d 1342, 1344 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1983) (refusing to order the demolition of a trespassing construction because there was no harm to the
plaintiff); Soifer v. Stein, 101 Pa. Super. 135, 1931 WL 3494, *4 (1930) (holding that plaintiff was only
entitled to money damages for defendant's building encroachment because of the balance of equities
between the parties).
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Communication costs are a type of transaction cost,5 and should be addressed in
an efficient manner-that is, additional communication costs should be incurred
until the marginal costs exceed the marginal benefits.
6
Existing scholarship analyzes some of the concerns involved in
communicating property entitlements and suggests some techniques for
achieving efficient communication. In this Note, I seek to fashion a general
framework that supports a more comprehensive analysis of communication costs
while also accounting for these existing theories. This approach helps identify
and fill both minor and more significant gaps and also suggests that this
framework can be applied to some non-property communicative contexts,
including the Internet.
In general, two factors determine the costs involved in communicating
property entitlements: (1) the messages and methods of communication, and (2)
the allocation of the costs of communication. Part II of this Note analyzes two
methods for communicating effective messages: boundaries and menus.
Although apparently distinct, these methods are similar in that each supports
concise, clear, easily understood messages that convey only the data needed for
successful communication. Such messages are cheaper and more effective than
complicated ones. Part III of this Note analyzes efficiency-enhancing allocations
of the burdens of communicating entitlements. I will argue that broad sanctions
should be used to place the burdens of communication on the cheapest
communicator and suggest some characteristics that identify this party.
Using the theory from Parts II and III, I will examine opportunities for
reducing communication costs on the Internet in Part IV. The Internet, like the
property rights system, involves a vast amount of data that must be
communicated to large and diverse groups of people. Because of this
informational similarity and because the Internet involves significant amounts of
intellectual property, the communicative techniques I develop in Parts II and III
can help to reduce communication costs online. Finally, in Part V, I conclude that
the strategies for efficiently communicating to large groups of people regarding
property entitlements can, and should, be applied to reduce communication costs
in many contexts.
II. MESSAGES AND METHODS
Reducing communication costs requires that messages, i.e., the information
being communicated, and the methods for conveying these messages be
coordinated. For example, restaurant menus and wine lists often label their
selections with numbers. A spoken number (message) successfully
5. See Coase, supra note 2, at 10.
6. See Terry L. Anderson & P. J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American
West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163, 165-67 (1966).
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communicates a patron's selection because of the use of a numbered menu
(method). This system is often easier and more accurate than descriptive
selections, particularly where the menu uses foreign languages or is otherwise
complicated. Message and method are sufficiently connected that analyzing
message/method pairs instead of focusing on message and method separately
may clarify this discussion.
7
A cheap, effective message/method pair has three properties. First, the
message/method should be simple. A distinct "yes" or "no" is easier to
communicate than an essay. Brief messages and methods help the sender to
convey information 8 and the recipient to digest that message once received. 9
Second, the message/method pair should be clear,10 so that it is easier to receive,
and less effort is wasted through requests for clarification and resending the
message. The chances of miscommunication are also reduced. For example,
communicating with hand signals in a noisy room may be a clearer method than
speaking. Third, even if a message is clearly communicated, the recipient may
not understand the content of that message without using other background
information. This is particularly true in property communications, which often
involve a large and indefinite class of people, perhaps with widely different
backgrounds. As a result, the message/method pair should be structured, so that
people can understand it without having to know a great deal of additional
information. 1
Unfortunately, maximizing these three characteristics may be difficult
because they are often in tension. For example, although simplicity may enhance
clarity, a simple message will be unclear if it is garbled. 12 A longer message with
more redundancy and clarification would be less prone to such confusion.'
3
7. Focusing on message/method pairs also reduces the potential confusion of trying to distinguish
messages and methods, which is sometimes impossible. For example, a fence can convey the location of
a boundary, but the fence can become the legal boundary under the doctrine of adverse possession. See,
e.g., Cole v. Burleson, 375 So. 2d 1046, 1048 (Miss. 1979) (holding that fencing can be an act of
adverse possession); Boone v. Frazor, 1988 WL 77542, *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 1988)
("Constructing a fence is an open and notorious act of possession if it is done by the adverse claimant..
. ."). But see, e.g., Buchanan v. Nixon, 43 S.W.2d 380, 382 (Tenn. 1931) (holding that a fence erected by
a property owner does not support a neighbor's claim for adverse possession).
8. See, e.g., J.R. PIERCE, SYMBOLS, SIGNALS AND NOISE: THE NATURE AND PROCESS OF
COMMUNICATION 25 (1961) (discussing the cost savings of sending shorter messages); see also Henry
E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1148-49,
1160-62 (2003) (analyzing characteristics enhancing the efficiency of messages).
9. See PIERCE, supra note 8, at 23, 29, 38 (stating that the recipient's uncertainty as to the meaning
of a message increases with the complexity of that message).
10. See id. at 23, 29-44 (discussing the effects of interference and noise on communications);
Smith, supra note 8, at 1163-64. For example, a "yes" or "no" is clearer than a mumbled "uh-uh," which
could mean either "yes" ("uh-huh") or "no" ("uh-uh").
11. Smith, supra note 8, at 1162-63; see also DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER, GODEL, ESCHER, BACH:
AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID 159, 162-63, 166, 170 (1979) (describing the importance of a listener
possessing background information in communications).
12. See PIERCE, supra note 8, at 25-26 (discussing the message.distortion that occurs when simple
electronic messages are transferred over long distances).
13. See id. at 9, 146-47 (stating that distortion in electronic messages can be reduced by making the
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Similarly, a recipient can more easily understand a message/method pair if it
contains much of the necessary background information.14 For example, a written
sentence could contain parenthetical definitions of uncommon words. Though
helpful, such definitions would certainly lengthen the sentence and could make it
hard to understand.' 5 Given these conflicts, effective communication should
focus on the aggregate benefits of these characteristics as a group.
To communicate property entitlements, we use (at least) two methods for
conveying simple, clear, easily understood messages: (1) boundaries and
boundary markers, and (2) menus.
A. Boundaries
Communication about property often focuses on the nature and extent of the
property entitlements involved. Conveying this information can be complicated
because property is highly variable. 16 For example, land can come in an
unlimited number of shapes and sizes,17 and copyrights can be licensed for
distribution in different places for different time periods.' 8 Despite this
variability, only the boundaries of property are relevant to many communications.
Boundary identifiers are a method of communicating short, clear, easily
understood messages in the form of conceptual abbreviations for the nature and
extent of the property.' 9 For real property, the boundary identifiers alone may
convey the contours of a parcel of land to a prospective buyer so that she can
decide whether to seek out the owner to purchase that parcel. Similarly, third
parties who wish to avoid trespassing need only know the outer limits of the
property to avoid encroachment. Boundaries also reduce enforcement costs for
the owner and authorities. 20 To determine whether a third party has trespassed,
the owner and authorities need only determine if the third party has crossed a
boundary without the owner's permission. In contrast, monitoring the behavior of
messages longer). Most analytical writers (and readers) are probably all too familiar with the tension
between verbal economy and clarity.
14. See Smith, supra note 8, at 1132 (stating that a recipient of a message may need more
background knowledge to understand a short message); cf. HOFSTADTER, supra note 11, at 173
(describing a short message that contains very little background information). But see id. at 170
(claiming that it is impossible for a message to contain all implicated background information).
15. See PIERCE, supra note 8, at 23 (discussing the interplay between uncertainty and informational
completeness); Smith, supra note 8, at 1169.
16. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus
Clausus Problem and the Divisibility ofRights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 382 (2002).
17. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 14.
18. Under the "Principal of Divisibility," any subdivision of a copyright may be transferred or
licensed. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2000) ("The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or
in part.").
19. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730 (2002) ("[All
property right] boundaries should be clear. This clarity is essential to promote progress, because it
enables efficient investment.").
20. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1327-28 (1993) (describing the
reduction in monitoring costs produced by clear boundaries).
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a person authorized to enter and use property is more complicated because
supervising use is more difficult than watching boundaries.
21
Boundaries are typically communicated through boundary "markers."
22
Boundary markers are publicly ascertainable indicia of the boundaries, like
fences and signs. Similarly, patent specifications filed with the Patent and
Trademark Office provide boundary markers in the form of a "written description
of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in...
clear, concise, and exact terms." 23 These patent boundary markers describe the
"metes and bounds" of the patent in clear and brief terms. 24 Although
establishing boundary markers may be expensive relative to the value of the
property,25 marking is often a cheap approach because costs may be low per
communication. This communication cost amortization is more likely when the
communicative power of the marker does not diminish with each
communication. For example, physical markers of real property boundaries and
patent specifications can communicate to a great many people without a
reduction in the communicative aspect of the marker.
Boundary markers can be both short and easily intelligible because they
usually do not require a great deal of extrinsic information to be understood.
Boundary limits and the means of conveying them have widely accepted,
consistent interpretations. 26 For example, traditional physical markers like "No
trespassing!" signs, fences, and walls always denote a boundary of some sort,
27
even if it is not always a legally significant boundary. The legal implications
and uses of these markers are consistent enough to support reasonable
conclusions. Boundary concepts are also consistent across different areas of law.
For example, intellectual property has identifiable boundaries that are at least
21. See id.
22. When publicly ascertainable boundary markers are not possible, a menu may be a more
efficient way of communicating the nature and extent of property entitlements. See Merrill & Smith,
supra note 1, at 34 (advocating the use of menus with "the dimensions of property rights that are least
visible"); infra Section II.B.
23. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
24. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (suggesting that a patent should not be issued
when the "metes and bounds of that monopoly are not capable of precise delineation").
25. Anderson and Hill analyzed the increase in property "definition" that occurred as the value of
land and livestock increased in the American West. See Anderson & Hill, supra note 6, at 169-76. As
land values rose, the marginal benefit of effectively communicating ownership also rose. In addition, the
marginal cost of visible boundary marking dramatically decreased with the invention and mass
production of barbed wire. As a result of these two shifts, during the 1870s, the communication of
ownership using barbed wire skyrocketed. In 1874, when barbed wire was introduced, only 10,000
pounds were sold. Id. at 175. In 1880, over 80,500,000 pounds of barbed wire were sold. Id. Similarly,
as livestock became more valuable, the marginal benefit of visible boundary marking by branding also
increased. Branding became legally required and significantly regulated. Id. at 173-75.
26. See Smith, supra note 8, at 1161, 1163 (discussing the importance of repetition and consistency
in property communication).
27. A fence designed to keep a dog in a landowner's back yard may not mark a legal boundary.
Even when people treat a non-legal boundary as legally significant for many years that boundary may
not develop legal significance. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Nixon, 43 S.W.2d 380, 382 (Tenn. 1931) (holding
that a fence erected by a property owner does not support a neighbor's claim for adverse possession).
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analogous to other forms of property. 28 The concept of boundaries will be
familiar even if the particular property context is unfamiliar.
29
Boundary markers that do require more background typically involve
specialized audiences that possess such information.30 For example, people who
regularly deal with intellectual property probably have more background
knowledge of how to discover and interpret intellectual property boundary
markers like copyright registrations and patent specifications. Persons less
familiar with more abstract forms of property like intellectual property are less
likely to need an understanding of the boundaries of these forms of property.
Because of their capacity for communicating without requiring extensive
background information, visible boundary markers are particularly useful with
31
real property. In part because of this utility, visible boundary markers for real
property are heavily favored over less tangible delimiters. 32 For example, one
way to describe a parcel is with metes and bounds, which use monuments,
courses, and distances to describe boundaries. 33 A typical metes and bounds
description might start:
Begin at the southernmost end of the old rock wall. Head due north to the covered
bridge. Head east 100 feet to the stream.
Sometimes, conflicts occur within a description. For example, suppose that
the covered bridge is northeast and not due north from the end of the rock wall.
Should the boundary be traced north as described or traced northeast to the
bridge? As a rule, the law favors monuments over courses, courses over
distances, and distances over quantities. 34 These preferences likely reduce
communication costs because less visible means of boundary description like
courses, distances, and quantities may require much external information like a
copy of the deed or surveying expertise and equipment. Therefore, the metes and
28. Unfortunately, intellectual property sometimes lacks clear boundaries. For example, the
doctrine of fair use blurs the boundary between infringing and non-infringing uses of copyrighted
material. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). Likewise, the doctrine of equivalents may extend the scope of a
patent beyond the literal description claimed in the patent application. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002) (describing the doctrine of equivalents). However,
the "fuzziness" of these boundaries is not dramatically different from that of some rights associated with
normal property. The use rights for real property are similarly fuzzy. See infra notes 76-85 and
accompanying text (describing the difficulties of sharply defining the use rights for real property).
29. See Richard M. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649,
1651-52 (2000) (describing the capacity of law to create "focal point[s]" that help people coordinate
when they have a common interest in coordinating, but have little information regarding the expected
behavior of others); see also Smith, supra note 8, at 1128-30; infra Subsection III.A.2.
30. See Smith, supra note 8, at 1173-77.
3 1. With chattels, visible signs of ownership, like a cattle brand, may be entirely determinative of
ownership. See Anderson & Hill, supra note 6, at 174. Cattle brands also were directed to a specialized
audience.
32. See CURTIS J. BERGER & QUINTIN JOHNSTONE, LAND TRANSFER AND FINANCE: CASES AND
MATERIALS 642 (4th ed. 1993); LYLE W. MALEY & WILLIAM A. THUMA, LEGAL DESCRIPTIONS OF
LAND 36 (1954).
33. MALEY & THUMA, supra note 32, at 2.
34. BERGER & JOHNSTONE, supra note 32, at 642; MALEY & THUMA, supra note 32, at 36.
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bounds description would be read to describe a boundary from the end of the
rock wall to the covered bridge regardless of the stated course.
Another way of describing a parcel of land is with a rectangular survey
description. Beginning in 1785, much of the undeveloped land in the United
States was surveyed and divided into plots by the federal government, in part
because there were "few natural characteristics suitable for use as monuments in
metes and bounds descriptions." 35 This survey system was part of the federal
scheme for distributing "uninhabited" land.36 The rectangular survey divided
government land with an imaginary but legally significant grid.37 Physical
monuments were placed at the comers of the grid squares. By necessity and
human error, the markers were not always placed on the actual comers of the
grid. In 1805, Congress discarded the abstract comers described by the grid in
favor of the visibly marked comers, declaring the marked comers to be the
legally binding determinants of the dimensions of the parcels. 38 The government
perhaps favored these physical markers because they required significantly less
extrinsic information than did conceptual boundaries that had to be individually
verified through surveys.
Although boundaries and their markers help to efficiently communicate the
nature and extent of property, establishing boundaries entails costs. More
complicated boundaries typically require more costly boundary marking.
Rectangular plots can probably be identified with fewer markers than an
octagonal plot would require.39 Subdividing parcels also increases the number of
boundaries to be marked. To promote efficiency, the benefit of increased
boundary complexity must be balanced against the cost. Additional savings can
be gained by further limiting the potential variability of property through the use
of menus.
B. Menus
As a result of legal restrictions, many aspects of property rights are not
completely customizable. Instead, the choice of rights is limited to selections
from a menu.40 Perhaps the best-known example of a property menu is the
doctrine of numerus clausus, under which the possessory estates in land are
limited to "five general types of present possessory interests: the fee simple
35. MALEY & THUMA, supra note 32, at 3. The lack of preexisting physical monuments prompted
the government to develop new means of demarcating land.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 3-13.
38. See 43 U.S.C. § 752 (2000).
39. Parcels that use natural features like streams for boundaries are likewise cheaper to delimit. Costs
may be further reduced by aligning boundaries with the points of a compass, as the American government
did in its rectangular survey of undeveloped land. See MALEY & THUMA, supra note 32, at 3.
40. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 16, at 376-78.
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absolute, the defeasible fee simple, the fee tail, the life estate, and the lease. ' 41
Attempts to create a new interest in land are generally disfavored, and courts will
usually force an innovative land interest into one of the established categories.
42
Property menus reduce communication costs by utilizing a method that
communicates with short, clear, easily understood messages. In general, a menu
is a list of standardized categories, and the message is short because it references
a category from the menu.43 For example, an exclusive license to copy and
distribute a copyrighted work need only refer to the § 106(1) and § 106(3) rights
under the copyright. The licensing contract need not describe what activities fall
under "copying" and "distributing." The definitions are inherent in the
standardized category. Other rights, like the rights to make derivative works and
to publicly perform the work, need not be mentioned because they are separate
rights under the copyright menu. Likewise, Euclidean zoning employs a menu
describing use rights to real property by classifying land into a limited number of
categories of permitted uses. 4 If A and B are negotiating for the sale of A's land
and the land is zoned "C" for commercial, all parties can use the zoning
ordinance to determine the permitted uses of the property. No other description is
required. In contrast, determining permissible land uses under nuisance law may
require larger information costs, in the form of legal expertise and litigation, than
are required under a zoning system. 45 In addition, using a menu fosters clear
communication because the intended recipient of the information need only
determine which menu selection has been referenced. Especially when the menu
of possibilities is small, the intended recipient can use a process of elimination to
deduce the intended message.46
41. Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 13 (analyzing the informational effects of a fixed menu of
interests in real property). The defeasible fee simple and leases can be further subdivided into a limited
number of options. Id. Copyright law also involves a menu of six separate legally protectible rights, but not
all copyrighted works enjoy all six rights. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1)-(6) (2000). These six rights can be
infinitely subdivided under the principle of divisibility, but no new rights can be created (except by
Congress). See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2000). But see Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 19 ("The [use of
menus] is probably at its weakest in the area of intellectual property.").
42. For example, a lease must be either a term of years, a periodic tenancy, a tenancy at will, or a
tenancy at sufferance. Id. at 11. A lease "until the end of the war" does not clearly fit into any of these
categories, and courts will force such a deviant lease into one of the accepted categories. See, e.g., Nat'l
Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Kalis, 191 F.2d 739, 740-41 (8th Cir. 1951) (holding that a lease until sixty days
after the end of World War II was to be treated as a tenancy at will); Stanmeyer v. Davis, 53 N.E.2d 22,
25 (111. App. Ct. 1944) (ruling that a lease "for the duration of the war" was a tenancy at will); Merrill &
Smith, supra note 1, at 11. But see Smith's Transfer & Storage Co. v. Hawkins, 50 A.2d 267, 268 (D.C.
App. 1946) (holding that a lease until the "end of war" with Japan and Germany was a proper term of
years because it was "certain to happen").
43. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 16, at 379.
44. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); see also ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON & VICKI BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 95-96 (2000) (describing the workings of Euclidean
zoning).
45. Furthermore, the permitted uses under nuisance law may be unclear until after litigation.
Owners may invest in improvements and uses that are later prohibited. As a result, resources may be
wasted developing an impermissible use.
46. See PIERCE, supra note 8, at 23 ("The more we know about what message the source will
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Many menus also reduce the amount of background information a party
needs to understand the message. To use a menu with a small number of
categories, people need only learn about the few menu options, instead of
learning on a case-by-case basis the details of particular property entitlements.
However, establishing a property menu involves two types of costs. First, the
menu must be created and communicated to enough people that it can be widely
referenced. Because the cost of establishing a menu will be amortized over all of
the communications in which there are savings, the total communication cost
savings often outweigh the startup CoStS.4 7 Second, because the menu limits
available property choices, some forms of property may be prohibited.48 The
opportunity costs of submitting to the restraining force of standardization-or
"frustration costs 9 --can be reduced in at least three ways.
50
First, some menu selections contain variables that allow for limited
customization. For example, a term of years can be for any time period, and a life
estate can last for the life of any owner.
51
Second, a menu can be expanded. However, creating new menu selections
can significantly increase both the amount of information that must be
communicated and the amount of background knowledge needed to understand
the menu selection. 52 Increasing the number of choices on a menu of property
rights may only trivially increase the communication costs of using that menu if
that expansion does not affect the techniques used to verify that an owner
possesses a certain property interest.5 3 For example, allowing a lease "until the
end of the war" for Blackacre would not significantly increase the costs of
determining the type of ownership for any parcel of land because the methods for
determining the ownership of the land are largely unaffected by the addition of
the new type of lease. Ownership would still be verified through public records
produce, the less uncertainty ...."),
47. See infra Subsection III.A.2. The more widely accepted a menu is, the greater the opportunity
for amortizing start-up costs.
48. For example, if the menu of possessory interests in land were reduced to include only the fee
simple, then many of the benefits of flexibility would be lost. There are great gains from trade in the many
contracts for leases, and these benefits would not be available under a menu that prohibited leasing. Cf
PIERCE, supra note 8, at 23, 28 (describing the informational shortcomings of communicating with a
limited number of options).
49. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 35-38.
50. Some menus may be "complete" in that there are no frustration costs. For example, we
conceptualize numbers by selecting digits from the fixed menu of numbers from zero to nine. Every
number can be described, at least theoretically, by concatenating (perhaps with a decimal) selections
from that menu of ten digits (although some numbers, like pi, may be hard to physically represent
because they require infinite decimal expansions). In Numerus Clausus, Merrill and Smith do not posit
whether the menu of interests in land is complete. Id. at 40.
51. JESSE DUKEMINER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 210,419 (4th ed. 1998).
52. Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 27.
53. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 16, at 380-81, 399, 401. In general, adding new
categories to a menu that already uses a public registry as a verification system may not significantly
increase communication costs. See id. at 395.
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and private contracts (leases) regardless of the form of ownership of that parcel.54
However, adding new menu selections will increase communication costs
when the new selection requires a new verification rule. 55 If a new menu option is
not accompanied by a required verification rule, then, for any property potentially
described by the menu, third parties must expend resources to determine whether
it falls under the new, difficult-to-verify menu option.56 Creating a new menu
option without a new verification rule thus allows some owners to externalize
communication costs to many third parties. Even if the parties establish a new
rule, applying it may increase communication costs because the new verification
rule must be communicated to all who use the menu. 57 Moreover, to ensure no
other property interests burden a piece of property, a party may have to apply the
verification rules for all potentially conflicting interests. 58 Even if a new menu
category does not require a new validation rule, adding that category may
significantly increase communication costs when menu categories are defined
using other menu selections. For example, a zoning category in Euclidean zoning
is often recursively defined by adding additional uses to previous zoning
59categories. Adding a new category may upset the scheme and create confusion.
Thus, adding new options to a property menu may produce additional
communication costs, and additions should only be allowed when expansion
increases overall efficiency.
60
The third way to reduce the frustration costs associated with a menu is to
allow the government to permit deviations from the standardized options.
Allowing limited deviations will reduce frustration costs, and, in evaluating an
owner's request to depart from a generally accepted menu, the government can
consider the third-party effects and any need for additional verification rules.
Requesting and attaining government approval, however, involves additional
communication costs that must be balanced against the accompanying benefits.
61
Finally, frustration costs can be eliminated if participation in a menu is
voluntary. With a voluntary menu, owners will not conform to the menu unless
54. See id. at 399.
55. See id. at397,401.
56. Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 27.
57. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 16, at 397.
58. Seeid. at401.
59. See Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 380-81 (1926) (defining recursively a
menu of zoning categories).
60. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 16, at 397.
61. One example of government-sanctioned menu departures arises with Planned Unit Developments
("PUDs"). A PUD is a custom-designed use designation that does not adhere to the standard zoning menu.
See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 44, at 107. PUDs are typically used with large real estate
developments. To apply for PUD designation, a developer must describe in his application such things as
the planned uses and densities for the development. The uses and densities outlined in an approved PUD are
in effect the "zoning" for the PUD. Unfortunately, for a parcel of land, a third party must expend resources
to learn whether the normal zoning schema applies and, if not, the nature of the PUD. In addition, the
applicant for a PUD must expend additional resources to request and obtain PUD designation.
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the communication gains to the owner from using the menu exceed the entailed
frustration costs. A voluntary menu, however, reduces communication costs less
than a mandatory one because third parties must determine whether any
particular piece of property is classified under the menu, and, if not, the third
party must learn non-standardized information regarding that property.
Furthermore, although a voluntary menu avoids the bureaucratic costs inherent in
a menu in which owners petition the government to depart from the standardized
options, voluntary menus can allow owners to externalize communication costs
to third parties.62 Nevertheless, because they can dramatically reduce frustration
costs, voluntary menus sometimes lower overall communication costs. For
example, although legal interests in land are limited to a mandatory menu, a
voluntary menu governs equitable interests in land because trusts allow for
substantial customization of equitable rights. When property is placed in a trust,
the trustee legally owns and is responsible for managing the property, and the
beneficiaries enjoy the benefits flowing from the property. In dividing the
benefits of property, owners can adhere to the traditional menu of interests used
for legal interests or create new equitable rights. "[I]n virtually any case, the
entire terrain of trust law is default law" that can be altered by the terms of the
63trust. Moreover, rejecting the standard menu for equitable rights does not
significantly increase communication costs because many communications are
concerned only with the legal ownership of the property, which remains limited
to the mandatory menu.
64
Thus, in designing a property menu, the frustration costs of standardization
must be balanced against the communication benefits. 65 Different types of menus
balance these costs differently and also differently distribute these costs between
owners and third parties. This distribution depends, in part, on the amount of
customization that the menu allows. Allowing deviation from a menu reduces
frustration costs for owners but may increase communication costs for third
62. As with an expanded menu, voluntary menus can increase communication costs. This increase,
however, may be lower when there exists a general verification rule for determining when an owner is
participating in the menu.
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 128 (1959) (declaring that "[t]he extent of the interest of
the beneficiary of a trust depends upon the manifestation of the intention of the settlor"); see John H.
Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 651 (1995). But see Merrill
& Smith, supra note 1, at 57 (stating that "the equitable interests of the beneficiaries [to a trust] are
described in terms of the common-law estates in land").
64. The communication costs of trusts are particularly small when the trustee has the power to sell
the trust property without approval from the beneficiaries. See Note, Dynasty Trusts and the Rule
Against Perpetuities, 116 HARV. L. REv. 2588, 2597 (2003) (noting that trustees often have the power to
sell trust assets). Restaurant franchising can also be viewed as a voluntary menu. In opening a restaurant,
a restaurateur can pay a fee to obtain a familiar franchise, i.e., select an option from the "menu" of well-
known franchises, or open a unique, independent establishment, thereby avoiding the menu of franchises
altogether. Customers are familiar with franchises, which reduces the cost of communicating to those
customers the types and quality of food offered at the restaurant. Adhering to the franchise requirements,
however, may produce some frustration costs. See also infra text accompanying note 219 (suggesting
the use of a voluntary menu to reduce communication costs).
65. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
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parties. A property regime should consider both the costs and benefits of a menu
and the allocation thereof. More generally, to promote efficiency, the burdens of
communication should be strategically allocated to promote their reduction.
III. ALLOCATING THE BURDENS OF COMMUNICATION
Communication burdens are the direct costs of successful communication,
the losses from unsuccessful communication, and the indirect opportunity costs
resulting from activities avoided because of excessive communication costs. All
three burdens are present with communications regarding property interests.
First, costs may be incurred in communicating the nature and extent of property
entitlements. Fences, for example, may be expensive, 66 and fences often occupy
some of the parcel of land, thereby preventing that portion of the land from being
used for other purposes. Second, communications regarding property may be
unsuccessful, resulting in infringements of property entitlements. 67 Finally, some
communication difficulties may prevent otherwise profitable uses of property.
For example, if one hundred persons own a parcel of land in common, the
communication costs regarding that property may prevent the property from
being sold or developed.68
The allocation of communication burdens affects behavior. For example,
forcing one party to reimburse another for the loss resulting from failed
communication provides an incentive for the liable party to work harder to
encourage successful communication.69 For example, if A and B share a common
border, and A is forced to bear any losses resulting from miscommunication of
that common border, A may erect a fence to identify the boundary. However, as
Coase points out,70 A may also decide that the cost of identifying the boundary
exceeds the potential losses from miscommunication and choose to incur the
losses resulting from B's encroachment on A's land. Therefore, unless one party
has a superior ability to lower communication costs, 71 burdens should be
66. The cost of fencing materials may have been prohibitively high in the American West before
the introduction of barbed wire. Anderson & Hill, supra note 6, at 171-72.
67. For example, two travelers with identical luggage may accidentally pick up each other's luggage in
an airport baggage terminal. The appearance of the luggage is, by itself, under-inclusive and thus fails to
communicate ownership. The failed communication may produce additional costs if the passengers leave
the airport with the wrong luggage. Correcting the error at this point will be difficult and expensive. At the
airport, communicating ownership of two identical suitcases without identification tags by opening the
suitcases can be time consuming (and potentially embarrassing).
68. Such a parcel of land suffers from a form of the tragedy of the commons. See, e.g., Hodel v.
Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 707 (1987) (describing the difficulties of managing property when commonly
owned by hundreds of persons). See generally Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons:
Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARv. L. REv. 621 (1998) (describing and
analyzing the concept of anticommons).
69. See Smith, supra note 8, at 1166-67 (suggesting that communication burdens should be
removed from parties to prevent them from incurring inefficient communication costs).
70. See Coase, supra note 2, at 6-7.
71. See infra Section III.C.
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allocated to the party best able to choose between the costs of improved
communication and the costs of failed communication.7
A. General Strategies
Before exploring the mechanisms for shifting communication burdens and
the characteristics of the party that can most efficiently reduce costs, I provide
in this Section two general strategies for efficiently shifting communication
burdens.
1. Relative Costs and Benefits of Shifting Burdens
Frequently, one party initially shoulders certain communication burdens.
The cost of fencing, for example, is initially borne by property owners.
Likewise, damage done by a trespasser when property rights are not effectively
communicated initially falls on the landowner. These burdens of
communication are often shifted through law or agreement. For example, the
cost of the damage from a trespass might be passed to the trespasser through
litigation. 73 However, such shifting is not free. Passing property laws,
developing private agreements, and litigating based on those laws and
agreements can be expensive. Therefore, it is important to allocate the burdens
of communication in a way that will reduce overall communication costs.
For example, the cost of undiscovered encumbrances on a parcel of land
reduces its value and thus initially falls on the current owner and not on any
prior owner. Property law typically leaves this loss with the current owner. If a
seller-without committing fraud-provides a buyer a title with hidden defects,
the buyer's remedies are limited to the terms of the deed, even if the sales
contract provides for additional remedies. 74 As a result, when a buyer purchases
with a quitclaim deed, she is liable for any encumbrances on the property, and the
sale price in the quitclaim deed probably reflects this risk. The burdens of
imperfect title can be shifted to the seller with a warranty deed, which extends the
seller's liability throughout the buyer's ownership. 75 This shift can sometimes
lower overall communication costs. The seller may have better knowledge of
other interests in the land because the seller has lived on the land for many years.
Using this information, the seller may be able to communicate with and quiet
those interests more cheaply. When the benefits of a seller's communication
advantages exceed the cost of shifting the risk of undetected encumbrances, a
72. Cf GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 26,
135-73 (1970) (arguing that efficiency in accident cost reduction is maximized by imposing liability on
the party best able to choose between accident and safety costs).
73. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 13, at 75-77 (5th ed. 1984).
74. This concept is known as merger of contract into deed. BERGER & JOHNSTONE, supra note 32,
at 675.
75. Id. at 676.
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warranty deed can promote efficient communication. Frequently, however, a
quitclaim deed will be more efficient because the gains resulting from shifting the
risk to the seller do not exceed the shifting costs.
2. Rule Utilitarianism
76
Allocating the burdens of communication for property entitlements to broad
categories of persons, instead of to individuals on a case-by-case basis, may
reduce communication costs in two ways. First, allocating these burdens to
categories eliminates the higher administrative costs of case-by-case decisions.
For example, in a sale of land, parties other than the buyer and seller may have an
interest in the land. However, after the closing, the buyer has no claim against the
seller for these prior interests (absent fraud or misrepresentation)." Because the
buyer will be legally connected to the land after the sale, and thus generally easier
to find, she is usually in a better position to resolve conflicts with prior interests.
Occasionally, the seller can sometimes quiet prior interests more cheaply than the
buyer because of actual knowledge of those interests. 78 Because communicating
with the buyer is generally cheaper, she is liable for prior interests, not the seller.
This result is probably efficient because determining which party can most
cheaply bear the costs of an inadequate title search may involve a great many
factors, and addressing those factors on a case-by-case basis is administratively
expensive. 79 Where the administrative costs of individually identifying the party
who can most cheaply bear a burden exceed the gains of case-by-case
determinations, a categorical rule approach is more efficient.
Second, the categorical allocation of burdens reduces the informational costs
of learning who bears certain burdens. 80 Such allocation helps each party
understand her own burdens. For example, purchasers (and not former owners) of
real property often bear the burden of recording their purchase. If the purchaser
fails to record, the newly purchased land may be lost. 81 As a result, a buyer is on
76. The goal of rule utilitarianism is to "adopt those rules which lead to the greatest good for the
greatest number." NORMAN E. BOWIE & ROBERT L. SIMON, THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE POLITICAL
ORDER: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 42 (1977). When maximizing
"good" means being "efficient," rule-utilitarianism advocates seeking broad rules that promote
efficiency on the whole. Such rules may be inefficient in particular cases, but those efficiency losses are
outweighed by the overall efficiency gains from the rule.
77. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
78. See id.
79. Parties may contract around this default as in the case of a warranty deed. Contracting around
the default may be evidence that, in a particular case, the cost of identifying which party can best bear
certain communicative burdens is exceeded by the gains from reallocation.
80. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics?, Ill YALE L.J. 357, 388 (2001); supra Section II.B.
81. See BERGER & JOHNSTONE, supra note 32, at 713-16 (describing various recording
requirements). There are three types of recording statutes. Under a "race" statute, a recording party has
priority over all unrecorded interests. Id. Under a "notice" statute, a purchaser has priority over prior
interests of which he had no notice. Recordation conveys notice to subsequent purchasers. Id. Finally, a
"race-notice" statute is similar to a notice statute except that, in order to have priority over a prior
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notice of the need to record the transfer quickly. Categorical allocation also helps
identify the burdens imposed on others. For example, a person wishing to
purchase a parcel of land must find the owner. Even if the potential purchaser has
never purchased land before, she knows from experience with property in general
that she must reach an agreement with the owner, since many aspects of the
category of "owners" are constant across many different types of property.82
Categorical allocation also promotes efficiency by preventing both parties from
bearing certain costs. After a sale of land, for example, if the burden for failed
communication with the holders of prior interests were determined on a case-by-
case basis, then both the buyer and seller could potentially bear the losses from
unsuccessful communication. As a result, both the buyer and seller might initiate
expensive title searches to protect against possible liability for prior interests.
Clear allocation avoids this wasteful, unnecessary duplication.
Although allocating communication burdens to categories may reduce
communication costs, excessive standardization may raise communication
costs. 83 The benefits of categorization and customization must be balanced. 84 For
example, if owners and tenants were lumped together into a larger category of
"possessors," communication costs would increase because a buyer would have
more difficulty locating the party that is able to sell the property. Likewise,
imposing the same communication burdens on the same categories of persons
across all different types of property would also increase communication costs.
Some burdens of communication, like the requirement that purchasers of real
property record their purchase, are specific to particular types of property. On the
other hand, categories should not be too small. Reducing the size of categories
increases the number of categories, which may raise communication costs.
85
Thus, the sizes of the categories and amount of subject-specific modification
must be tailored to reduce total communication costs.
B. Preventing Inefficient Behavior by Reducing Externalization
Imposing communication burdens in a manner that reduces the
externalization of communication costs generally improves efficiency. Costs are
externalized when one party enjoys the benefits of communication or avoids the
costs of failed communication, but does not bear the costs of communication.
86
interest of which the purchaser had no notice at the time of purchase, the purchaser must record before
that prior unknown interest. Id.
82. See McAdams, supra note 29, at 1651-52 (describing the capacity of law to create "focal
points" that help people coordinate when they have a common interest in coordinating but have little
information regarding the expected behavior of others); Merrill & Smith, supra note 80, at 390 ("[T]o
keep the information costs... low, large numbers of exclusion rights must be bunched together and
simple bright-line rules must be adopted for all ... similar resources.").
83. See supra Section lI.B.
84. For discussion of this point in the context of menus, see notes 40-65 and accompanying text.
85. See supra Section lI.B.
86. For simplicity I will assume that there are only negligible externalized benefits. In general,
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For example, if a person remains silent about facts that are important in a
situation where she will not bear the full costs of that silence, that person
externalizes communication costs. To discourage such inefficient silence, a legal
regime may impose duties to disclose. For example, section 551(2)(e) of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts requires one party to a transaction to disclose facts
to the other party if "he knows that the other is about to enter into [the
transaction] under a mistake," provided such a disclosure requirement is
reasonabl[e]. The disclosure requirement is generally reasonable when it
would be difficult for the mistaken party to learn about the mistake.88 Requiring
disclosure when the costs of silence are great can prevent externalization. 89 If A
sells a house infested with termites to B without informing B of the insects, B
may suffer a loss because the house is worth less than the purchase price.90 In
addition, by the time B learns of the termites, significant damage may be done
that could have been more cheaply prevented by earlier action. By remaining
silent, A has externalized the costs of the failed communication about the termite
damage to B. This externalization is an inefficient approach to communication
costs because the owner is likely to know of the termites already and can cheaply
inform the buyer, but the buyer cannot discover the problem without spending
money for a professional to examine the property. 91 Consequently, A is legally
liable for B's loss so that externalization can be prevented.
In general, imposing a cost on an otherwise externalizing party, as in the
infested house example, will encourage efficiency.92 When an appropriate cost is
"costs" and "benefits" are read broadly, so that "costs" includes reduced benefits and "benefits" must
include reduced costs. In addition, the relevant costs and benefits are those that result from the activity.
As a result, aligning the costs and benefits of an activity requires some notion of causation that is
beyond the scope of this Note. Cf CALABREsI, supra note 72, at 198-235 (describing the difficulties of
matching activities with costs).
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(e) (1977).
88. See Wolf v. Brungardt, 524 P.2d 726, 734-35 (Kan. 1974) ("Where one party to a contract or
transaction has superior knowledge, or knowledge which is not within the fair and reasonable reach of
the other party and which he could not discover by the exercise of reasonable diligence, or means of
knowledge which are not open to both parties alike, he is under a legal obligation to speak ... ").
89. Scholars disagree regarding the optimal level of disclosure. Compare KIM LANE SCHEPPELE,
LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON LAW (1988) (focusing on the possible
harm to an ignorant party if disclosure is not required), with Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure,
Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978) (arguing that disclosure requirements
reduce the incentives for people to discover and use information).
90. B may also suffer a loss if he expends resources to learn the information that A can more
cheaply learn (e.g., that the house is infested).
91. In Wolf the court said:
Where one party to a contract or transaction has superior knowledge, or knowledge which is
not within the fair and reasonable reach of the other party and which he could not discover by
the exercise of reasonable diligence, or means of knowledge which are not open to both parties
alike, he is under a legal obligation to speak.
524 P.2d at 734.
92. See CALABRESI, supra note 72, at 68, 73. But see R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General
Theory of the Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956-1957) (arguing that when inefficiency stems
from more than one source, elimination of only one of those sources may not increase overall
efficiency).
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imposed on the actor, the actor will avoid the inefficient communication (or the
activity underlying the communication).93 The previously externalizing party
may also work to reduce the now internalized communication costs by
employing a communicative advantage.
94
1. Preventing Externalization of Communication Costs with Sanctions
Though prices and sanctions can both prevent inefficient externalization, they
are appropriate in different circumstances. 95 A price "is [a] payment of money"
equal to the externalized costs. 9 6 When an appropriate price is imposed on an
activity, the actor realizes the full utility of the activity. As a result, to maximize
personal gain the actor will behave efficiently. For example, imposing contract
liability on a breaching party can be viewed as an efficiency-enhancing price.
97
Because this liability internalizes the cost to the breaching party, that party will
only breach when the benefits from breach exceed the total costs.98 For a legal
regime to impose a price, however, the regime must be able to adequately
measure the externalized costs. 99 The legal regime need not be able to evaluate
the efficiency of the underlying activity because the actor will make such a
determination once the price is imposed. Prices are a market approach that allows
an actor to choose the socially optimal behavior. 1
00
In contrast, a sanction is a "detriment imposed for doing what is
forbidden."10 1 Sanctions are a collective approach to promote behavior society
believes to be efficient and deter activity society considers wasteful. 102 Sanctions
encourage two efficiency-enhancing goals. First, where the total costs of an
activity exceed its benefits, the activity will be deterred if the imposed sanction,
discounted by the probability of enforcement, is larger than the benefits of the
activity.1°3 For example, some types of pollution are deterred by civil and
93. See CALABRESI, supra note 72, at 73.
94. See id; Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1523, 1526 (1984).
95. Cooter, supra note 94, at 1525-26.
96. See id. at 1525.
97. Id. at 1544-47; cf Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) (describing a
similar effect with liability rules in torts).
98. Cooter, supra note 94, at 1544.
99. Id. at 1532.
100. See CALABRESI, supra note 72, at 135-73; Cooter, supra note 94, at 1552.
101. Id. at 1524.
102. See CALABRESI, supra note 72, at 174-97. Some activities, like trespassing, are controlled
using both prices and sanctions. Compensatory damages impose a price on the trespassers for the
damage caused by the encroachment. However, large damages may be imposed on a trespasser even
though no actual damage was caused. See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis.
1997) (upholding an intentional trespass judgment of S 100,000 where no actual damage had been caused
to the landowner's property). These punitive damages sanction the trespasser.
103. Cooter, supra note 94, at 1527. The activity may be efficient in exceptional circumstances, but
the administrative costs of identifying those exceptional cases exceed the gains. See supra Subsection
III.A.2. Providing subsidies, which increase the benefit of avoiding an inefficient activity, may also
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criminal penalties. 104 Second, an act may be sanctioned if the actor can reduce the
total costs by changing the manner of conducting the activity.10 5 For example, if a
power plant can install devices to reduce pollution to acceptable levels, a sanction
larger than the cost of the devices will promote this socially optimal cost
reduction. 0 6 The utility of both approaches is constrained by the fact that a legal
regime must be able to determine either that the activity is inefficient or that the
actor possesses some cost-reducing ability.1
0 7
Externalized costs are difficult to measure in property communications;
therefore, prices are often ineffective in preventing externalization. 10 8
Measurement is difficult because property rights affect large, indefinite groups of
people including owners, trespassers, buyers, and regulators, and these groups
may share externalized costs unequally.' 0 9 Furthermore, the number of people
implicated by externalization will probably increase over time. To determine total
externalized costs, communication costs in the future must be discounted to
present value, which further hinders accurate measurement of externalized costs.
Though sanctions also have limits, they are well suited for preventing
inefficient property communication externalization in two situations. First, with
some property issues, community standards help identify inefficient activity that
shape behavior.
104. See Elizabeth M. Jalley et al., Environmental Crimes, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 403 (2002)
(describing civil and criminal penalties for violations of federal environmental law). But see Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liabiltiy Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARv. L.
REV. 713, 748-52 (1996) (arguing for the greater use of liability rules in controlling pollution).
105. When the actor can cheaply reduce communication costs, the level of precaution an actor takes
to reduce those costs is generally inelastic with respect to changes in the level of sanction. Cooter, supra
note 94, at 1529, 1540. In contrast, actor behavior is highly elastic with respect to prices. Id. at 1529. As
a result, even though actors will discount prices and sanctions by the probability of enforcement,
lowering that probability affects behavior with sanctions less than with prices. Id. at 1551.
106. Sanctions also reduce the administrative costs that are inherent in case-by-case price
determinations. Id. at 1535. The costs of determining the sanction can also be amortized over a large
number of people. See infra Subsection III.C.2.
107. See CALABRESI, supra note 72, at 174-97.
108. However, prices are sometimes effective controls on the externalization of communication
costs. For example, an accidental trespasser can cheaply avoid the costs of failed communication by
contacting the landowner before causing damage through trespassing. The trespasser can determine the
identity of the landowner more easily than the landowner can determine the identity of the trespasser
because the trespasser can inspect the land, ask neighbors, or research the title. The landowner
frequently has little indication which third parties may become trespassers. If the trespasser does not
contact the landowner and causes damage through his trespassing, the landowner initially bears these
costs. The trespasser has externalized the costs of failed communication. To prevent such
externalization, the costs of encroachment (ascertainable damage to the land) are imposed as a price to
the trespasser. This penalty is a price because it is equal to the externalized costs and encourages an
efficient level of precaution for trespassers. The price is larger than the cost to the trespasser of avoiding
the externalization because the trespasser can cheaply contact the landowner before entering the land.
Landowners still bear some of the burden of failed communication in that landowners frequently cannot
recover administrative costs incurred when challenging a trespass. That there remains some cost to the
landowner does not affect the efficacy of the price on the trespasser because the price is large enough to
prevent the trespasser from externalizing. Moreover, those administrative costs to the landowner may
encourage him to more clearly mark the boundaries to his property. These administrative costs may
serve as sanctions on property owners. See infra Section III.C.
109. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 26-34.
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can be prohibited through sanctions.110 An example of the use of such standards
to limit inefficient externalized communication costs arises with property menus,
which have been developed and used by the community over time.1 ' Deviations
from menus may reduce costs because customization lowers frustration costs. 
12
However, because the externalized costs associated with customization are
difficult to measure, identifying efficient customization may be infeasible. The
long-standing use of property menus provides a community standard, indicating
further customization is inefficient. A representative body like the legislature can
implement these community standards, and the courts can enforce the menu by
converting a non-conforming property interest into a selection from the menu.
113
Converting the non-standard interest to a menu selection destroys the benefits
from such customization, and, thus, deters such behavior. For example, courts
have often converted non-standard leases, like a lease "until the end of the war,"
into a selection from the standard menu of leases.
114
The second scenario where sanctions are well suited for preventing inefficient
externalization in property communications is when the externalizing party,
because of an advantage that can reduce total communication, is the cheapest
communicator.'t 5 A sanction can force this party to utilize its communication
advantage. For example, a landowner can often cheaply avoid the costs of failed
communication with third parties by recording the title. The owner has a
communication advantage because she knows the scope of her ownership and
can amortize the costs of recordation over the potentially large number of third
parties who will need to learn of that ownership.1 6 If the landowner does not
record her title, third parties must individually learn of the ownership. To prevent
the landowner from externalizing these costs, the owner is threatened with loss of
the property if she does not record.1 17 Typically, this sanction is larger than the
cost to the owner of recording because the cost of recording is significantly less
than the value of the land.118 Thus, sanctioning owners encourages socially
110. Officials can use community standards to decide whether a sanction is appropriate. "A
community standard represents a consensus among private individuals about socially optimal behavior.
In many circumstances, government officials can observe the community standard, but not the costs and
benefits which private individuals took into account when arriving at it." Cooter, supra note 94, at 1533.
111. See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 11-12, 38-40, 58-59 (noting that changes to the
legal menu for interests in land come from the legislature and not from the courts); see also supra
Section lI.B.
112. See supra Section lI.B.
113. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 59-60. Euclidean zoning is an example of a menu
adopted by ordinance. A PUD provision in the zoning ordinance allows some customization, but the
customization remains subject to government approval. ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 44, at 107.
114. See supra Section lI.B.
115. See infra Section Ill.C; cf. CALABRESI, supra note 72, at 135-73 (describing the search for the
cheapest cost avoider in accident prevention). Prices can also be used to encourage the cheapest
communicator to act, but sanctions are more appropriate with property communications.
116. See infra Section III.C.
117. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
118. Sanctions are most effective when the cost of avoiding the sanction is small relative to the
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optimal behavior.
2. Setting an Appropriate Sanction: Dispossession
When the owner of property is the cheapest communicator but fails to use her
communication advantage, dispossessing the owner is often an effective sanction
to encourage efficient communication for three reasons. First, because of
difficulties in determining the externalized costs, it may be administratively
infeasible to relate the sanction to the individualized communication costs of
different owners.'l 9 Even a sanction of some percentage of the value of the
property may entail expensive valuation and liquidation costs. In contrast, total
forfeiture is easily applied to owners of different properties with varied
communication skills. Second, because owner communication costs are often
low, imposing a penalty of total property forfeiture is likely larger than costs. 120
Thus, owners are encouraged to behave efficiently. Finally, forfeited property can
be redistributed to a party that is unlikely to engage in future inefficient
communication cost externalization.
Unfortunately, forfeiture is a blunt tool with at least two potentially negative
effects. First, if owner communication costs are high, the owner may not be the
cheapest communicator, and such a large sanction may encourage inefficient
behavior. Fortunately, as previously noted, when sanctions conform to
community norms, instances of such inefficiency are infrequent. Second, seizing
property can dramatically alter the incentives for developing that property.
However, when owner communication costs are low, the sanction will rarely be
applied, and owners will retain normal incentives to develop.
The doctrine of adverse possession provides an example of using forfeiture to
prevent externalization of communication costs.' 2 1 If A meets the statutory
requirements of adverse possession, 122 A can become the owner in fee simple of
sanction itself. Cooter, supra note 94, at 1530-31, 1535.
119. See supra Subsection III.A.2 (describing rule utilitarianism and administrative costs).
120. The owner's communication costs may infrequently be greater than the externalized costs, i.e.
externalization may be efficient, but these rare exceptions may be difficult to identify. Because the
owner's communication costs are typically less than the externalized costs, categorically allocating the
burdens of communication to the owner promotes efficiency. Cf Cooter, supra note 94, at 1530-31
(describing the effect of sanctions on actors for whom "nonconformity with the legal standard is cheaper
than conformity" and noting that "where a reasonable obligation is backed by a reasonable sanction,
most people will find conforming strongly advantageous").
121. Every state has an adverse possession statute. BERGER & JOHNSTONE, supra note 32, at 807.
122. A can adversely possess O's land if she possesses it continuously, exclusively, hostilely, openly,
and notoriously for a time period specified by statute. Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse
Possession, 89 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2423 (2001). In some states, adverse possession may include some of the
following additional requirements: payment of property taxes, "color of title," and good faith by the
adverse possessor. See id. at 2424, 2430-31. In rare cases, courts have required bad faith by the adverse
possessor. Id. at 2431; see, e.g., Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz, 106 N.E.2d 28, 30 (N.Y. 1952) (ruling
against possessor who was unaware of encroachment on neighbor's land). A's possession is open if it
would be revealed by a casual inspection and is notorious if it is widely known. See Stake, supra, at 2423.
But see, e.g., Mannillo v. Gorski, 255 A.2d 258, 264 (N.J. 1969) (holding that a concrete walk
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another person's property.' 23 One explanation for the doctrine of adverse
possession is to prevent owners from externalizing communication costs., 24 By
leaving her land unattended, 0 reduces her own communications costs relating to
the property, but externalizes some communication burdens to parties who wish
to use, buy, or avoid encroaching on the land.125 For example, a neighbor who
wishes to clarify a property boundary before constructing a building may have
trouble contacting 0. Likewise, a third party who wishes to rent the land may
find it difficult to contact 0 if neither 0 nor O's agent lives on the land.12 6 The
longer the owner is away from the land, the more difficult it is for a third party to
contact the owner and to be sure that 0 is the true owner.' 27 Because these third
parties form an indefinite, potentially large group of people, externalized costs
are both hard to measure and potentially large.
The costs to the owner of avoiding the externalization, and thereby avoiding
the adverse possession, are generally low. 128 To prevent adverse possession, the
owner need only learn that the land is being possessed and evict this possessor.
129
Because the adverse possession of the land must be open, continuous, and
notorious, the owner or her agent is only required to briefly visit the land-or
even simply contact a neighbor--once every five years or so to learn of the
adverse possessor's developing claim. Owner communication costs are also
likely to be low because the doctrine of adverse possession does not operate
against classes of owners, such as minors130 or the mentally impaired, 131 who are
unlikely to be able to cheaply reduce communication costs.
Dispossession also enhances efficiency in other ways. First, because the
seized land is transferred to the adverse possessor, future communication costs
are probably reduced. Since the adverse possessor has possessed the land
continuously, openly, and notoriously for the statutory period, it will likely be
easy for third parties to contact the once-adverse possessor and now owner of the
property. Second, rather than blunting development incentives, dispossession
through the doctrine of adverse possession encourages the effective utilization of
encroaching on a neighbor's land was not open and notorious because the boundary violation could only
be discovered by a survey). Statutory time periods range from five to twenty years. Stake, supra, at
2439.
123. Id. at 2422.
124. But see Stake, supra note 122, at 2436 (arguing that the threat of adverse possession will
negligibly improve communications because landowners will only minimally increase monitoring of
their land).




129. Legal costs may be expensive, but summary process will limit the eviction costs for a bona
fide owner.
130. A special statutory period for adverse possession begins to run at majority. See DUKEMINER &
KRIER, supra note 51, at 151-52.
131. Id.
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land by preventing land from being left unused for extended periods of time.' 32
The "plain meaning" rule for reading wills presents another example of how
dispossession can sanction the externalization of communication costs.
Generally, the "plain meaning of a will is not to be disturbed by extrinsic
evidence that another meaning was intended."' 133 Evidence of the testator's intent
is admissible only if the will is ambiguous once applied to the facts.' 34 The force
of the plain meaning rule was clearly demonstrated in National Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Children v. Scottish National Society for the Prevention
of Cruelty to Children.135 The case tragically proceeded as follows:
[A] Scotsman, who had always lived in Scotland and was interested in Scottish
charities, leaving a number of bequests to them by will, bequeathed £500 to "The
National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children," which was the charter
name of a society in London, of which the testator had never heard. Near his home
was a branch office of the Scottish National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Children, whose activities he knew .... The House of Lords held the remote
charity in London should get the money because "he had by name designated it.1
36
Because of such decisions, commentators have sharply criticized the rule of plain
meaning.' 37 However, the rule internalizes communication costs and thus forces
testators to use care in drafting their wills.
When determining the testator's intent requires extrinsic information, the
testator has failed to communicate her intent through her will. This can result
because the testator did not expend the necessary effort to ensure that she
communicated her intent through the will. If the property is allocated according
to a complex hearing concerning the testator's intent, the testator's savings
increase costs for the beneficiaries and the probate court. These externalized costs
are difficult and costly to measure because they are externalized to a potentially
large and heterogeneous group, including the beneficiaries and the state.
Usually, the cost to the testator of avoiding externalization through more
careful drafting is small, or at least small relative to the externalized costs. Even
132. See Stake, supra note 122, 2435-36, 2442-46 (presenting arguments that adverse possession
encourages investment and development). But see id. (giving counterarguments to those pro-investment
and pro-development claims).
133. JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 409-10 (6th ed.
2000) ("In construing wills, a majority of jurisdictions follow (or purport to follow) the plain meaning
rule: A plain meaning in a will cannot be disturbed by the introduction of extrinsic evidence that another
meaning was intended."); see, e.g., In re Estate of Smith, 555 N.E.2d 1111 (tll. App. Ct. 1990) (applying
the plain meaning rule); Mahoney v. Grainger, 186 N.E. 86, 87 (Mass. 1933) (same).
134. Mahoney, 186 N.E. at 87.
135. [1915] A.C. 207 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Scot.).
136. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 133, at 412-13.
137. See, e.g., JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 9 A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW INCLUDING THE STATUTES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF ALL
JURISDICTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA §2462, at 191-96 (3d ed. 1940) (arguing that
"words always need interpretation" and that "the 'plain meaning' ... is simply the meaning of the
people who did not write the document"); John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformation of
Wills on the Ground of Mistake: Change of Direction in American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 521, 527
(1982) (supporting Wigmore's view).
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the cost of drafting a complicated will is likely to be less than the costs of
litigation. These legal battles may not always arise, even when a will is unclear.
For example, the beneficiaries may not challenge the court's interpretation of the
will if the extrinsic evidence of the testator's intent does not conflict with the
court's interpretation. However, where litigation is involved, the plain meaning
rule can result in forfeiture. This forfeiture is not the loss of the property itself.
Instead, the testator's estate loses its statutory ability to dispose of the property in
accordance with the testator's intent. This dispossession fosters efficiency
because the threat of such loss encourages testators to avoid latent ambiguities
and their accompanying externalization of costs.
C. Identifying the Cheapest Communicator
Using the sanction-based strategies discussed above, the burdens of
communication should often be shifted to the "cheapest communicator." In this
Section, I analyze some of the characteristics that identify that party.
1. Allocating Burdens to Parties with Knowledge
Distributing communication burdens to parties who already possess relevant
knowledge or who can easily learn it fosters efficient communication.
138
Identifying these parties depends in part on which types of relevant information
are involved. The first type of pertinent information is the nature and extent of a
property interest involved. 139 Often, the owner of the interest possesses the best
knowledge of the property's parameters; consequently, the owner bears the
burden of communicating those parameters. For example, the "claims" portion of
a patent application describes with words the metes and bounds of the proposed
patent. 14  The patentee possesses superior knowledge of the invention and,
therefore, bears the burden of accurately describing the invention through the
claims.
138. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text. This requirement that the burdens of
communication be shifted to a party with knowledge does not require broad disclosures by either party.
Rather, if two parties desire to communicate some information, then the burdens of that communication
should be distributed to encourage the exchange of that information. Where the cost of acquiring the
information is high, it may be necessary to allow nondisclosure to provide incentives to acquire
information. See Kronman, supra note 89. The discussion above assumes that such incentives are not
required.
139. Imposing burdens on a party with knowledge to encourage that party to reveal that information
is similar to an information-forcing penalty default. See Ian Ayres & Robert Germer, Filling Gaps in
Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). Penalty defaults
are contractual defaults that are intentionally contrary to the intent of at least one of the parties. Id. at 91.
The parties' interests will only be expressed if they contract around the penalty default. As a result, the
penalty default forces parties to reveal information. Id. at 94. However, placing the burdens of
communication is not a penalty default. If the parties to a contract do not contract around a provision, a
contract still exists. If a party to a communication possesses knowledge, but does not use that
information, the communication might be unsuccessful or might not occur at all.
140. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000); Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966).
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Claims may be misleading or inaccurate in three ways. First, claims may be
narrower than the full contours of the invention.' 41 If so, the scope of the patent
will be limited to the claims and will not extend to unclaimed aspects of the
invention. 142 Second, the claims may be broader than the underlying invention
disclosed in the patent application, in which case a patent will not issue.
143
Finally, the scope of the claim may be unclear because of ambiguous language. If
so, the claim is limited to the narrower interpretation, even if the patent could
have been filed with clearer but broader claims. 144 Imposing these burdens on the
patentee promotes efficiency by encouraging the party with superior knowledge
to communicate clearly the full metes and bounds of the invention through the
claims.
45
The second type of knowledge relevant to communications is knowledge of
the identities of the parties needed for the communication. 146 Communication
costs may be reduced by allocating communication burdens to parties with this
knowledge or the ability to discover it easily. 147 For example, this burden
allocation strategy is one reason trespassers bear the costs of trespassing even if
the trespass is accidental. 14  Owners and third parties must communicate
regarding the nature and extent of the owner's land, but they are not likely to
know each other. Third parties are better able to initiate this communication
because they have a superior capacity to learn the owner's identity. The third
party knows the location of the land and can probably find the owner by visiting
the land or identify the owner by asking neighbors. The owner, on the other hand,
141. Because the claims are to be read in light of the specification, some aspects of the invention
that are not literally included in the claims may be covered by the patent. See, e.g., Vitrionics Corp. v.
Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that a patentee may define terms in the
specification and use those terms in the claims).
142. However, under the doctrine of equivalents, some material that is not literally covered by a
claim may fall within the scope of the patent. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki
Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732 (2002) ("The scope of a patent is not limited to its literal terms but instead
embraces all equivalents to the claims described.").
143. For example, in his patent application for the telegraph, Morse claimed any machinery that
uses electro-magnetism "for making or printing intelligible characters, signs or letters at any distances."
O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 62 (1853). The Supreme Court affirmed a ruling denying protection for
the claim saying that Morse "claims an exclusive right to use a manner and process which he has not
described and indeed had not invented." Id. at 113. Morse's claim arguably could cover the Internet
today.
144. Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("Where
there is an equal choice between a broader and a narrower meaning of a claim, and there is an enabling
disclosure that indicates that the applicant is at least entitled to a claim having the narrower meaning, we
consider the notice function of the claim to be best served by adopting the narrower meaning.").
145. Other requirements of the Patent Act also encourage the patentee to disclose the details of his
invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
146. Cf Coase, supra note 2, at 15 (noting that "discover[ing] who it is that one wishes to deal
with" is an important transaction cost).
147. Because property communications often involve indefinite groups of people, knowledge of the
parties to the communication may initially be lacking.
148. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 99 (2000).
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lacks knowledge of third parties, and cannot easily learn this information. 149
A third category is knowledge of activities relating to the property. For
example, a third party may possess superior knowledge about utilizing another's
property. With copyrights, independent creation of a work that is similar to the
copyrighted work is an adequate defense to a suit for infringement.150 The alleged
infringer often possesses superior knowledge about whether a work was copied
or independently created. As a result, if the copyright owner demonstrates that
the creator of a substantially similar work had access to the copyrighted work,
then the creator bears the burden of showing that the substantially similar work
was not copied.' 51 This communication burden is imposed on the alleged
infringer in part because of that party's better knowledge of whether the work
was copied.
A final kind of knowledge germane to property communications is expertise.
Some parties specialize in certain forms of communication. For example, lawyers
have some communication advantages in describing the desires of a client in a
will. Lawyers know both the client's legal options and the means of
implementing those choices. Consequently, lawyers bear some of the risks of
failed communication and may be liable to the beneficiaries for both breach of
contract and malpractice.'
52
Property law should be devised in a way that avoids situations where no party
possesses needed information. For example, the standard menu of leases is
limited to four options: the term of years, the periodic tenancy, the tenancy at
will, and the tenancy at sufferance. For each option in this menu, the owner of the
property either has the knowledge of when the lease will end or the power to
terminate it quickly. 53 Consequently, a person interested in using or buying the
land could either learn the date when a tenant's interest will end or encourage the
owner to terminate the interest. This restraint on the menu of leases imposes
opportunity costs (frustration costs) on parties who would create a different kind
of lease, like a lease "until the end of the war."' 54 With such leases, an owner
149. Criteria for identifying the cheapest communicator may conflict. Owners have a better
knowledge of the extent of their entitlements. Because the owner may get punitive damages where the
trespasser knows the boundary and would not recoup attorney fees from an accidental trespasser, the
owner has an incentive to use this knowledge and mark the boundary clearly.
150. See Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1169 (1997) ("The Copyright Act
forbids only copying; if independent creation results in an identical work, the creator of that work is free
to sell it.").
151. Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 181 (1976).
152. See, e.g., Simpson v. Calivas, 650 A.2d 318, 321, 323 (N.H. 1994) (holding that a lawyer who
prepares a will can be liable to the beneficiaries of the will for both breach of contract and malpractice).
153. A term of years is a lease for a fixed period of time. A periodic tenancy is a lease for fixed
intervals of time lasting until either the landlord or tenant gives notice of termination. A tenancy at will
is lease with no fixed period enduring until either the landlord or tenant give notice of termination.
Finally, a tenancy at sufferance develops when a tenant retains possession of the property after a prior
lease has expired. The landlord may either evict the tenant or create a new lease. See DUKENINIER &
KRIER, supra note 51, at 419-25.
154. See supra Section II.B. But see Smith's Transfer & Storage Co. v. Hawkins, 50 A.2d 267, 268
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would neither know nor be able to control the temporal dimensions of the lease.
The menu imposes these frustration costs to ensure the presence of parties with
knowledge, thereby reducing communication costs. 1
55
Similarly, the different versions of the rule against perpetuities balance the
benefits and costs of ensuring that all vested interests in real property can be
determined within a limited time period. 156 Under the traditional common law
rule, all contingent interests in land must be logically guaranteed to vest within a
time period described by "lives in being plus 21 years."' 57 The traditional rule
assures the immediate 158 presence of information regarding interests in real
property but may frustrate testator intent by invalidating interests that are likely,
but not logically guaranteed, to vest within the perpetuities period.159 Under the
wait-and-see rule, a "contingent interest is valid if it actually vests within the
common law perpetuities period."' 160 By voiding any interests that do not vest in
this period, the wait-and-see rule both restrains contingent property interests and
reduces frustration costs for testators. To further increase the predictability of
contingent interests, some states have adopted the wait-and-see for ninety years
rule, under which a contingent interest is valid if it is guaranteed to vest within
the traditional perpetuities period or it actually vests within ninety years.' 61 Thus,
each version of the rule against perpetuities balances the testator and beneficiary
frustration costs against the benefits of ensuring the presence of information
regarding ownership. 1
62
(D.C. 1946) (holding that a lease until the "end of war" with Japan and Germany was a term of years
because it was "certain to happen").
155. In Numerus Clausus, Merrill and Smith justify the use of a fixed menu in interests in land but
do not suggest why we have this particular menu. See generally Merrill & Smith, supra note 1.
156. Contingent interests in land prevent property from being marketable because the identities of
the owners are unclear until the contingencies are resolved. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 133,
at 854. The rule against perpetuities may also prevent the "concentrat[ion of] wealth to the detriment of
society... [and] lead to generational inequities." Joel C. Dobris, The Death of the Rule Against
Perpetuities, or the RAP Has No Friends-An Essay, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601, 614 (2000).
Despite these apparent advantages, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Wisconsin have completely
abolished the rule against perpetuities. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 133, at 854.
157. Id. at 793.
158. The rule is a rule of logical proof in that, at the time the interests are created, they must be
guaranteed to vest before the expiration of the perpetuities period. Id. at 794-95.
159. For amusing examples of interests that are likely but not legally guaranteed to vest, see
DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 133, at 798.
160. See DUKENINIER & KRIER, supra note 51, at 312. Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Mississippi, New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington have adopted
some form of the wait-and-see rule. Id. at 313.
161. Id. at 313. The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (USRAP) introduced the wait-
and-see for ninety years rule. Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, and West
Virginia have adopted USRAP. Id. at 315.
162. See id at 315-16. "Dead hand control" is also undesirable because we want current owners (not
former owners) to decide the current uses of property. See id. at 291-92.
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2. Amortization
Property communications frequently involve a large, indefinite group of
people, 163 and one party may have a better ability to amortize communication
costs over this group and thereby reduce the cost per communication. Law and
private agreements encourage the party with this advantage to use it. For
example, a purchaser of land risks losing her new land if she does not promptly
record in part because she can amortize recordation costs over many
communications with third parties, including subsequent purchasers, neighbors
who wish to verify property boundaries, and courts who must resolve property
disputes. 164 Because of their superior ability to amortize, similar recordation and
notification burdens are placed on patent owners, who must describe the metes
and bounds of their patent in a separate section of the application.1 65 On a more
general level, mandatory property menus present enormous opportunities for
amortization because the cost of learning the menu is amortized over many uses
of the menu.'66
Private agreements also amortize communication costs. For example, the
Broadcast Music Industry (BMI) and the American Society of Composers,
Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) have collectivized the performance rights of
many copyrighted musical works. 167 BMI and ASCAP are able to amortize
communication costs over copyright owners, licensees, and copyright infringers.
With copyright owners and licensees, BMI and ASCAP can amortize the costs of
negotiations and communications through standardized licensing contracts.
Moreover, because of the primacy and visibility of BMI and ASCAP, licensees
and copyright owners do not incur great communication costs in locating each
other's agents.' 68 In fact, licensees and copyright owners will likely never have to
meet. Finally, the costs of communicating to infringers and to authorities
regarding those infringements can be amortized over the many copyright
contracts that BMI and ASCAP hold.'69
163. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 80, at 395.
164. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. Property law sometimes uses sanctions to
encourage amortization with chattels. For example, in some Western states, branding of cattle was once
"legal proof of ownership." See Anderson & Hill, supra note 6, at 174. The cost to the ranchers of
branding could be amortized over the many times that ownership of the cattle must be determined. The
cost of branding could be quite high because rounding up cattle on the open plain was difficult. Id. at
175. As a result, cattlemen began to participate in group roundups. Id.
165. See supra notes 140-145 and accompanying text.
166. See supra Section lI.B.
167. See CRAIG JOYCE ETAL., COPYRIGHT LAW 568-69 (5th ed. 2001).
168. By collectivizing, BMI and ASCAP have reduced the communication costs of licensees
determining with whom they should deal. Collectivizing reduces the knowledge needed to find the
parties needed for a transaction. See supra Subsection 11I.C. 1.
169. The Copyright Clearance Center similarly serves as an.amortizing middleman for negotiating
licenses to photocopy written works. See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 167, at 506.
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3. Other Communication Advantages
Other traits may make a party the cheapest communicator. For example, the
neutrality and trustworthiness of some parties may encourage others to
communicate with them. Trust beneficiaries, for instance, might be more
comfortable communicating with trustees than with each other. Trustees are
financially neutral and constrained by their fiduciary duties, 17 while some
beneficiaries, like income beneficiaries and remaindermen, have conflicting
interests. This criterion is less important than advantages involving amortization
and knowledge because most parties to property communications are not neutral.
In any case, the list of communication advantages herein is meant to be
illustrative, not exhaustive.
IV. INTERNET COMMUNICATION
The Internet is a new and unique forum for property communication and
transactions. People buy, sell, trade, and infringe copyrighted works on the
Internet. Similarly, people use websites to buy and sell real property and chattels.
In many traditional communications regarding property, rules have developed to
reduce communication costs to efficient levels. However, because the rules for
online property communications are still evolving, this digital environment
presents new challenges for applying old techniques to reduce communication
costs.
The Internet also involves communication that does not involve property but
is similar to property rights communication in that it, too, involves large and
indistinct groups of people. A website must communicate with many different
parties to attract users interested in its content. Likewise, users must sift through
many websites to find those that meet their preferences. Because property and
Internet communications both involve communication among many diverse
people, the framework developed in Parts II and III of this Note can help to
improve Internet communications. 7
Applying property communication techniques to the Internet requires an
understanding of its communicative peculiarities. Three general characteristics of
the Internet are particularly important. First, many parties who communicate
using the Internet, such as website operators and software-savvy users, are, in
essence, experts in using computer programs to communicate. Strategies that
encourage these parties to apply their expertise can reduce communication
170. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 133, at 929 ("A trustee has the duty to deal with
both the income beneficiary and the remainderman impartially.").
171. Indeed, Internet jargon is highly evocative of property. Users "visit" web "sites," which in turn




costs. 17 2 Second, the Internet connects vast numbers of parties. These large
numbers allow for significant amortization of communication costs. 173 These
numbers, however, can also support inefficient free-riding, and some parties are
likely to attempt to engage in such behavior. Locating these externalizing parties
to communications can be difficult. Finally, because the Internet is built on
computers, much communication can be automated, which can eliminate some
costs.
A. Copyright Protection and Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Software
Illegal copies of copyrighted works like software and music are easily created
and distributed on the Internet. 174 Peer-to-peer file sharing software, which helps
users locate each other and exchange files over the Internet, is often used to
distribute these illegal copies.' 75 Not all files exchanged through this software
infringe copyrights. For example, some musicians and programmers encourage
the online dissemination of their works. 17 6 Nevertheless, because many of the
traded files do infringe copyrights, some companies have been enjoined from
providing and supporting their file sharing software. For example, in the highly
publicized case of A &M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., the Ninth Circuit upheld
an injunction preventing Napster.com from supporting peer-to-peer file
sharing. 177 The Court held that Napster was liable for contributory copyright
infringement because Napster had either actual or constructive knowledge of
primary copyright infringement by users 178 and because Napster had materially
contributed to those users' infringements.' 79 The liability of other peer-to-peer
software companies is unclear, however, because the software packages of those
companies are significantly different from those of Napster.com.
180
Peer-to-peer exchange software implicates a basic communication problem.
A company providing such software may not want or intend to support copyright
infringement by users.'81 However, because the company cannot cheaply contact
and communicate with copyright owners, the peer-to-peer network must treat
172. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing the communication advantages of
expertise).
173. See supra Subsection lI.C.2 (describing amortization of communication costs).
174. See Assaf Hamdani, Who's Liable for Cyberwrongs?, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 901, 910, 914
(2002).
175. Giovanna Fessenden, Peer-to-Peer Technology: Analysis of Contributory Infringement and
Fair Use, 42 IDEA 391, 393 (2002); see also Joseph A. Sifferd, Note, The Peer-to-Peer Revolution: A
Post-Napster Analysis of the Rapidly Developing File-Sharing Technology, 4 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC.
92, 104-06 (2002).
176. Fessenden, supra note 175, at 404-05; Sifferd, supra note 175, at 100.
177. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
178. Id. at 1021-22.
179. Id. at 1022.
180. Fessenden, supra note 175, at 402-05; Sifferd, supra note 175, at 105-07.
181. Such an assumption is inappropriate with Napster.com because it had constructive knowledge
of copyright infringement through its network.
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copyrighted and un-copyrighted files similarly. Under the current system, either
the software companies must be enjoined or file sharing allowed. 182
Unfortunately, both options maintain the communication failure and,
consequently, produce difficult-to-measure externalized costs. First, some authors
who desire the dissemination of their work will be unable to do so. 183 Because
infringing files cannot be effectively separated from non-infringing ones,
measuring the amount of these losses is difficult. Second, the injunction imposes
costs on the users who cannot exchange non-infringing files. Finally, an enjoined
company may lose advertising revenues, user membership fees, and opportunities
to negotiate copyright licenses between copyright owners and users. 184 However,
if copyright owners are not given additional protection, then file-sharing
companies and users will enjoy the benefit of file sharing while externalizing the
hard-to-measure costs of infringements to the copyright owners. 185 As I noted in
Subsection III.B. 1, prices cannot effectively deter the externalization of
communication costs when those costs are difficult to measure. Instead, to
prevent externalization, lower communication costs, and encourage efficiency,
sanctions should be used to induce all parties to employ their respective
communication advantages.
Communication costs between owners and peer-to-peer software companies
may be reduced under the following sanction-oriented proposal.' 86 First, software
companies should be prohibited from supporting the exchange of any files that
lack a digital "tag" containing copyright identification information. The data tag
should include the name of the file, the author or artist, a data field that indicates
whether the file should be available for online sharing, and, if so, a price (if any)
for downloading. 187 A company should be liable for contributory copyright
infringement for supporting the exchange of untagged copyrighted material. 188
Second, if a user wishes to exchange a file that lacks a tag, the user who desires
182. 1 decline to suggest which alternative is more likely or more efficient.
183. Fessenden, supra note 175, at 404-05; Sifferd, supra note 175, at 100.
184. Fessenden, supra note 175, at 401.
185. Indeed, the music industry blames peer-to-peer file sharing software for much of the recent
decline in music sales. Justin Oppelaar, Biz Seeks Music ID, DAILY VARIETY, Feb. 11, 2003, at 7.
186. This proposal focuses on the communication cost ramifications of peer-to-peer file sharing.
This problem is legally quite complicated, and a full discussion of the issues is beyond the scope of this
Note. This application is meant to highlight the informational dimensions of the problem rather than to
provide an all-encompassing solution.
187. Alternatively, the data tag could just be a number that allows a person to locate the listed
information in a database.
188. This proposal would expand the software companies' copyright liability by making them
liable for contributory infringement despite having no notice that the exchanged files were copyrighted.
Despite Napster, the vicarious liability of the websites before notification by copyright owners is
unclear. See Sifferd, supra note 175, at 103. Without some knowledge of the infringing files, a peer-to-
peer software company has little ability to prevent infringement by users. In Napster, the injunction
imposed no duty on Napster.com to limit file sharing until the plaintiffs "provide notice to Napster of
copyrighted works and files containing such works available on the Napster system." A&M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001). Consequently, this proposal would require
some change to the laws governing contributory infringement of copyrighted works.
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to download the file can request that the software company attach a tag. The
software company may either refuse the request or attempt to contact the
copyright owner to gain approval for attaching a tag. The requesting user can
suggest a copyright owner for the software company to contact, but the user
cannot create or manipulate a tag.' 89 Alternatively, a user may be able to request
a tag directly from a copyright owner or his agent. If the user's request for a tag is
granted, that user can download the file under the terms of the license from the
copyright owner. Third, copyright owners who wish to share their works should
all provide licensing information (or contact information) to a centralized contact
list that software companies can access. Software companies and users would use
this contact information to request the copyright owner's permission to support
file sharing for untagged files. Finally, peer-to-peer software companies would
only allow users to search each other's files on the basis of the information
contained in the tags.
This proposal lowers communication costs and fosters efficiency by
encouraging copyright owners, users, and peer-to-peer software companies to
employ their communication advantages. 190 Copyright owners possess two
communication advantages. First, unlike the software companies and the users,
the copyright owners possess superior knowledge about the cost of copying the
work. Second, copyright owners can amortize communication improvement costs
over the potentially large group of people interacting with the work, including the
software companies, potential copyright infringers, and future licensees.
Copyright owners who do not facilitate the provision of data tags for their digital
works face a mild sanction because their works will not be disseminated (and
licensing fees will not be collected) through peer-to-peer software. 191 Fortunately,
these new communication costs for the copyright owners are probably small. For
example, data tags could be automatically included with every digital musical
recording. Responding to requests for licenses to share files from software
189. In fact, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) already prohibits users from
tampering with Copyright Management Information (CMI). 17 U.S.C. § 1202 (2000). The proposed
digital tag is a form of CMI. The DMCA does not require copyright owners to include any type of CMI,
perhaps because copyright owners may not have originally presented their works for online exchange.
For example, a photograph in a magazine can be scanned into a computer and then exchanged on the
Internet. Because the photograph came from the magazine, it does not have a digital tag. Likewise, many
copyrighted digital works were created before the need for CMI arose. Some commentators argue that
the use of CMI should be limited because it could be used to track user behavior and invade user
privacy. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, A Right To Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright
Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CoNN. L. REv. 981, 1038 (1996) (arguing that CMI might be used to
invade user privacy). However, the legislative history of the DMCA demonstrates that Congress "does
not include digital information used to track or monitor usage of copyrighted works." Pamela
Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations
Need To Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 531 n.64 (1999).
190. See generally supra Section III.C (discussing communication advantages).
191. See generally supra Subsection III.B.1 (describing the use of sanctions to deter the
externalization of communication costs).
Yale Law & Policy Review
companies can likely be automated to a great extent.' 92 Copyright owners' desire
to receive licensing fees and to have their works disseminated should prompt
them to use their superior knowledge and their amortization abilities. Copyright
owners who do not wish for their works to be exchanged are free to remain
inactive.
Users also possess communication advantages because users know which
files they want to download and also know whether those files possess
identification tags.193 User participation costs in the above schema are likely
small enough to encourage users to use this superior knowledge. For tagged files,
users may have to pay a licensing fee.194 Nevertheless, because downloading
music is likely cheaper than purchasing physical media like CDs, the licensing
fee probably will not deter users from supporting peer-to-peer networks. Users
may also be reluctant to request tags for untagged files because of the effort
involved. However, software companies and copyright owners can probably
streamline the request process to reduce these user communication costs. In
addition, users may not have to make many requests. Because copyright owners
can benefit from the online licensing and sharing of their works, they would
probably include data tags on their files, thereby reducing the importance of the
request process.
This proposal also encourages software companies to use two competitive
advantages. First, software companies have expert knowledge of computer
programming and the exchange of files over the Internet. As a result, these
companies can more easily develop software to require tags for file sharing, to
allow file searching only based on information in the tags, and to streamline the
request process for new tags. Second, file-sharing companies can amortize their
communication costs by spreading costs over the large number of users who use
their software to exchange a large number of files. Peer-to-peer software
companies would be encouraged to adopt the above proposal and employ their
192. The copyright owners' participation costs can be further lowered through collectivized
organizations. A collectivized copyright pool (like BMI and ASCAP) could amortize over many
copyright owners some of the costs of registering with the contact list and responding to requests for
new tags. A tag provision service might be similar to the music information services provided by
Gracenote's CDDB. When clients convert compact discs into alternative file formats, like mp3s, this
service allows clients to automatically download information about those files, like artist name, song
title, and album title. Without such a service, the user might need to enter that information manually.
CDDB currently contains information on over 1.8 million albums and twenty million songs. See
Gracenote CDDB, at http://www.gracenote.com/gnjproducts/cddb.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2003).
193. Because the file sharing software will not allow sharing for untagged files, inability to share a
file indicates that the file lacks a tag.
194. A licensing fee can be paid electronically to the copyright owner with a credit card or to a
collective organization (like BMI or ASCAP). Alternatively, users could pay a fixed fee to download
any copyrighted work. The Copyright Act already requires mandatory licenses in certain areas. See 17
U.S.C. §§ 111, 114-16 (2000). These mandatory licenses serve as liability rules and, therefore, lower
communication costs. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972) (describing the use
of liability rules). The costs of establishing a mandatory licensing scheme can also be amortized over
many transactions. See supra Subsection III.C.2.
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competitive advantages through the threat of a major sanction: the full
injunctions currently sought by copyright owners.' 95
This proposal may allow users to illegally exchange copyrighted works
through two deceptions. First, the user could request and receive a tag for the file
by mislabeling the file. Thus, the file would have a legitimate but inaccurate data
tag and be available for free downloading. However, such a deception would be
short-lived under the proposal because file-sharing software can only index files
using the information in the data tag. A user may be able to make an unapproved
copyrighted work available for downloading, but few other users will be able to
learn of the file's true contents. Second, users may be tempted to register as
copyright owners under names very similar to legitimate copyright owners in
order to obtain tags that are informative to other users. For example, a user may
register as "The Beetles" in order to approve his own requests for songs by The
Beatles. Such tags would allow other users to find songs by the Beatles if those
users were clever enough to search under deviant spellings. If copyright owners
are required to provide contact information to register on the contact list, users
may be reluctant to engage in such deception. Verification of user contact
information will increase the likelihood that the user will be liable for those
infringements. 1
96
The music industry has taken the first steps towards implementing this
proposal by developing a new international system for tagging digital files.
197
These tags, called "Global Release Identifiers" (GRids), can be attached to many
types of digital files, including sound recordings, text, images, video, and
software.198 The tags are coordinated by a central agency that allows copyright
owners to register basic information (like the copyright owner's name) with a
GRid tag. The goal of the GRid system is to "identify what music has been
created, assigned, licensed, distributed and exploited." The music industry
considers the GRid system "an important step in developing legitimate and
195. Even some peer-to-peer companies that have been considered immune to infringement actions
are now facing suit. Compare Sifferd, supra note 175, at 105-06 (claiming that the peer-to-peer software
company Kazaa is "well outside the grasp of U.S. copyright laws"), with Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 243 F. Supp. 2d. 1073, 1080 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that the federal court for
the Central District of California has jurisdiction to hear a copyright infringement suit against Kazaa
even though Kazaa is a Netherlands corporation and its key assets are owned by "a company organized
under the laws of the island-nation of Vanuatu").
196. Contact information might automatically be verified through credit information. Though
illegal under this proposal, users may also attempt to manipulate data tags themselves without
permission from the copyright owners. Even if the tags were protected through technological measures
like encryption, it is likely that some software-savvy users would learn to circumvent such protections.
If the number of users who impermissibly tamper with tags is small enough, however, this proposal may
still promote efficiency.
197. International Federation of the Phonographic Industry, New Electronic Identifier Helps
Develop Legitimate Online Music Market, at http://www.ifpi.org/site-content/press/20030210.html.
(Feb. 10, 2003) [hereinafter New Electronic Identifier]. The new system augments a pre-existing tagging
system. Id.
198. International Federation of the Phonographic Industry, GRid Handbook Part 4: GRid System
Operation, at http://212.134.114.163/grid/gridhandbook_4.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2003).
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efficient delivery of music online."'199
Despite progress toward implementing the proposal, it is unclear whether the
frustration costs of the proposal would render it inefficient. If peer-to-peer
software companies are restricted to tagged file sharing, there may not be enough
file sharing for those companies to profit.200 Notwithstanding the progress made
by the music industry, the administrative costs of establishing the tagging system
described in the proposal could also render it infeasible.20 1 Empirical facts
regarding costs and benefits of the proposal are not available. As discussed in
Subsection III.B.1, sanctions are usually designed around community norms
regarding cost-effective behavior. 20 2 Such norms may not have developed yet in
the new and rapidly changing online environment. Nevertheless, the above
proposal will likely reduce the costs of successful communication. If the gains
from successful communication exceed the losses from frustration costs, then the
above proposal would encourage cheaper communication and efficient behavior.
B. Managing Website Content on the Internet
Communication problems often arise when Internet users want to determine
the content provided by websites to avoid websites with certain content, like
203pornography or obscenity. Websites possess information regarding their own
content, but high communication costs often prevent successful communication
199. New Electronic Identifier, supra note 197. However, the music industry has "no plans as yet to
use the system to track songs that have been uploaded to free file-sharing networks." Oppelaar, supra
note 185.
200. Instead, record companies may develop their own software for online music delivery. Indeed,
record companies have licensed much music for downloading, and the number of websites that offer
music for downloading for a fee is increasing. However, these websites do not provide peer-to-peer
networks; they allow downloading from a centralized source. Maryanne Murray Buechner, Too Legit,
TIME ONLINE EDITION, at http://www.time.com/time/techtime/200304/sites-angel.html (April 7, 2003).
The success of these centralized and lawful websites may limit the financial viability of peer-to-peer
software.
201. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 16, at 397; supra text accompanying notes 55-60.
202. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
203. "[E]xplicit sexual and violent content has become rampant on the Internet." Elizabeth M.
Shea, Note, The Children's Internet Protection Act of 1999: Is Internet Filtering Software the Answer?,
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 167, 168 (1999). Because the number of websites and the number of people using
the Internet are both growing rapidly, the need for effective Internet content management is also increasing.
Moreover, local governments are now in the market for "technical protection measures" that can render
offensive web pages inaccessible. Children's Internet Protection Act of 1999 (CIPA), Pub. L. No. 106-
554-Appendix D, 114 Stat. 2763A-335. Under the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA), public
libraries must install filters on publicly accessible Internet terminals to receive federal funding. The
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania declared CIPA facially unconstitutional because
the under- and over-inclusiveness of current filters violated the First Amendment. Am. Library Ass'n v.
United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 495 (E.D. Pa. 2002). The Supreme Court reversed. United States v.
Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. 2297, 2309 (2003). A plurality argued that the over-inclusive filters did
not violate the First Amendment rights of adult viewers. Id. However, the two concurring votes
completing the majority explicitly based their decisions on the Solicitor General's claim that the filters
would be deactivated at the request of an adult library patron. See id. at 2309, 23 10. Requiring adults to
use current Internet filters is likely unconstitutional.
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of that information.204  This communication is similar to property
communications because the website must communicate the nature of its content
to a large and indefinite group of people. For example, a children's website might
want to communicate to users (or their parents) that the site does not include
adult material, does not allow anonymous chatting, does not sell products, and
does not contain links to websites with adult material. Because website content is
highly variable, a user may be unable to determine the nature of a website's
content without first studying the website, possibly thwarting the user's efforts to
avoid such content.
20 5
Intemet filters, a type of computer software, can significantly reduce the costs
involved when websites and users communicate. Current Intemet filters work by
compiling a "control list" that divides websites into categories, like
"Adult/Sexuality," "Advertising," and "Chat." 20 6 The user selects which of the
207predefined categories to block. When a user attempts to enter a website, the
filter compares the entered website to the control list to determine the website's
category. If the category is blocked, the filter prevents the user from visiting the
website. Filters significantly lower communication costs because the filtering
process is quick and automatic, and the software companies can amortize the cost
of writing software and assembling the control list over a vast number of
communications.
Unfortunately, current filters also create new communication costs because
they are both under-inclusive (by not blocking undesired websites) and over-
inclusive (by blocking desired websites).208 One source of under-inclusive
blocking is that most of the Internet is not categorized in control lists. As of
2002, there were approximately two billion web pages on the Internet, and 1.5
209million new pages are added each day. Control lists generally contain less
than a million entries. To try to keep pace with this growth, many filters use
automated software to expand their control list, but automated classification is
substantially inaccurate with current technology. 211 Filter companies try to
204. A website may benefit from this failed communication by attracting visitors who would
otherwise avoid the site. For example, a person interested in learning more about national landmarks
may visit www.whitehouse.com, a pornography website. However, many websites advertise their
services offline, which indicates that some sites would benefit from successful communication.
205. See Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. at 2306 (discussing the difficulties of evaluating visual
content on websites); Am. Library Ass "n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 431 (same).
206. Am. Library Ass"n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 428-29.
207. Users can unblock or block specific sites.
208. See Am. Library Ass 'n, 123 S. Ct. at 2302, 2306; Am. Library Ass 'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 448-
49. The Journal of the American Medical Association recently evaluated blocking products used in
schools, libraries, and home computers. Caroline R. Richardson et al., Does Pornography-Blocking
Software Block Access to Health Information on the Internet?, 288 JAMA 2887 (2002). The test found
that at their most restrictive settings, the filtering programs blocked twenty-four percent of medical
websites and only ninety-one percent of pornography websites. Id. at 2887.
209. Am. Library Ass 'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 436.
210. Id. at 428.
211. Id. at 432. For example, many filters would like to block offensive images, and current
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remedy this computer inaccuracy through human review. However, because of
the enormous volume of websites that must be processed, human review is
plagued by human error. 21 Also, reviewers may base the categorization of a
large nimber of websites on the review of only a few web pages. For example,
one filter classified as "Sex, Profanity" all of the pages on Salon.com, which is
a site containing much innocuous material, because one page on the site
contained a regular column on sex. 2 13 It is difficult to identify and remedy
classification errors because control lists containing the classifications are trade
secrets of the software companies. 214 If a website learns that it has been
misclassified, it can request reclassification, but no filter undertakes systemic
reclassification, even though website content changes over time.215 Finally, even
when a filter has accurately classified a website, the filtering company's criteria
may not reflect the tastes and values of a particular user.216
Using a menu of categories of website content could reduce the
communication costs that arise with flawed filters.217 The information that a
website must convey to the user would dramatically decrease because the website
would only need to communicate a selection from the menu in order to
communicate the general nature of the website's content.218 Admittedly, because
website content is highly variable, the menu will likely need to be voluntary to
reduce frustration costs, which will diminish the communication cost savings of
the menu.2 19 Nevertheless, the menu selections will likely reduce communication
costs for communications regarding participating websites. Just as Euclidean
zoning reduces the costs of learning permitted uses of land, software could easily
use a menu to determine a website's content.
A website content menu could be implemented using two technological
techniques. Under the first method, new domain name suffixes could be created
that indicate the menu selection, and thus effectively establish a scheme of
"Internet zoning. ' 22° For example, pornography sites could be identified with a
".prn" suffix. Websites providing anonymous chat rooms could use a ".who"
suffix. In fact, the U.S. government recently created a new domain ".kids.us"
with the hope that the domain would be voluntarily populated by websites that
promote "positive experiences for children and families using the Internet.",
22
'
"[i]mage recognition technology is immature, ineffective, and unlikely to improve substantially in the




215. Id. at 435-36. Internet filters update the control lists with new websites.
216. Some filters employ limited feedback from users. Id. at 431.
217. See generally supra Section II.B (discussing the use of menus).
218. See id.
219. See supra note 62 and text accompanying notes 61-64 (discussing voluntary menus).
220. See Shea, supra note 203, at 200-01.
221. Dot Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-317, 116 Stat. 2766.
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Similarly, a private corporation has created a new .kids domain to "establish and
promote the development of a complete network of kid-friendly websites.,
222
These new domains will help parents control the content viewed by their children
because web browsers can easily be confined to websites with certain domain
suffixes. Although websites catering to children may migrate to these new
domains, many children's websites worry that changing their names, i.e., their
website addresses, will dramatically reduce the number of visitors to their
sites. 2
23
The second approach to implementing a website menu avoids the costs and
confusion resulting from websites changing their names. Under this approach,
each web page has a digital "zoning tag" that indicates the content category for
the page. This schema could use zoning tags like "pornographic," "violent,"
"commercial," and so on.224 Using zoning tags may also foster communication
because a website could simultaneously use numerous tags. For example, a
website's content could be designated "violent" and "pornographic." Thus, the
second approach may produce fewer objections and support more expressive
communication.
Regardless of which approach is used, website content classification may be
problematic because of the difficulty of separating the content into discrete
categories. For example, art can be hard to distinguish from pornography, and a
website may claim that its pornography is art. These classification problems can
be avoided by adopting Internet zoning categories and then utilizing users'
superior knowledge of their own opinions regarding website content. Under this
scheme, all websites would initially be placed in a general-purpose catch-all
category. 225 Users who desire to use the zoning system would categorize websites
that they visit, and only users who provide feedback would be able to use the
222. About Us, kids Domain, Inc., at http://www.kidsdomains.org/kdi/about_us.htm (last visited
Dec. 27, 2003). Content standards for the kids domain is determined based on a wide variety of
international guidelines. Content Guidelines, .kids Domain, Inc., at
http://www.kidsdomains.org/kdi/contentguidelines.htm (last visited Dec. 27, 2003).
223. See, e.g., Anick Jesdanun, Not Everyone On Line with Kid-Safe Domain, TULSA WORLD, May
12, 2002, at 10 (stating that some websites feel that users are "so accustomed to '.com' that any
alternative would mean 'zero traffic"'). At present, there are only ten websites in the kids.us domain.
See kids.us at http://www.kids.us/ (last visited March 22, 2004). A link from the .com website to the
.kids.us or .kids website could likely reduce the concern that the investments in the .com domain name
would be lost.
224. Current filtering programs use a classification schema similar to this proposal, but existing
filters poorly classify websites. See Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 428-29
(E.D. Pa. 2002) (listing categories of exclusion currently employed by four major content filtering
programs). Utilizing user evaluations would improve classification. See infra notes 225-227 and
accompanying text.
225. Efforts to create kid-friendly domains are simplified examples of a voluntary menu with a
catch-all category. Currently, most websites are in the "general" category except for those sites in the
.kids or .kids.us domains. Some websites are in preexisting categories like the .gov and .mil domains, for
government and military websites, respectively. I decline to suggest whether it would increase efficiency
to extend this menu to include additional categories.
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zoning schema.226 This feedback could then be used to shift websites from the
"general" categories to a more specific zoning category after users complete a
statistically significant number of evaluations. Each user could also set a personal
level of protection by requiring a certain percentage of evaluations to agree in
order for a website to leave the "general" category. For example, a parent may
configure his Internet browser to access only websites that have more than a
ninety percent rating in the categories "education" and "children" and have a less
than fifteen percent rating in "shopping." Users may also be able to exclude
evaluations from distant communities. A parent in Nebraska might not want the
votes of users in Europe to determine the content viewed by his children.
22 7
Efficient implementation of Internet zoning will require the cooperation of
websites, which possess two advantages in communications with users. 22 First,
as noted earlier, website managers are experts in web design and can modify their
websites to support user classification relatively cheaply. Innovative
programmers might also be able to sell their software to other web companies.
Second, websites can amortize the cost of modifying their websites over a large
number of communications. Market forces may encourage websites to use these
communication advantages to implement a user categorizing system because
many websites would benefit as specific classifications attract more users
interested in their content.229 For example, a children's website could attract more
children if their parents believe that the website is particularly child-friendly.
230
More specific menu classification would also prevent websites from wasting
resources on users who are not interested in their content. If users can more easily
avoid a website that does not interest them, the website's servers will need to
support fewer disinterested users. Websites that do not support user-feedback
categorization will remain in the "general" category where they will only be
viewed by users willing to operate in such an open environment.
226. Moreover, using the filter could also improve Internet search engines. A user could search for
terms with a typical searching tool and then only view responses that fall within certain filter
classifications. The dual benefits from using the zoning system would, thus, encourage users to evaluate
websites.
227. Restricting the focus to those users in the same "community" would protect filters from some
of constitutional attacks that the filters currently face. SeeAm. LibraryAss'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 429.
228. See generally supra Section III.C (discussing communication advantages).
229. In general, a mandatory classification scheme backed by government force is problematic for
two reasons. First, a website's First Amendment rights to free speech may prevent rigid classification.
For example, an art website may object to being labeled a pornography site on free speech grounds. See
generally Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (declaring the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds). Second, the
United States has little control over websites hosted in foreign jurisdictions. Those websites could not be
forced to migrate to more restrictive domains. Thus, a voluntary menu is more feasible than a mandatory
one.
230. Even a voluntary menu will require an enforcement mechanism to prevent websites from




Property and Internet communications are only two examples of
communications involving large numbers of parties. Such mass communication
is not limited to these contexts. For example, communications between the
government and the citizenry are often mass communications. The government
has often adopted many of the above-described techniques to improve
communication, and the Homeland Security Advisory System, i.e., the federal
government's menu of terror threat levels, is just the latest example. That menu
helps people, most importantly law-enforcement personnel, easily understand the
government's threat assessment and helps law enforcement personnel quickly
coordinate their actions.2 31 However, this system may increase policing costs and
limit security. Officials either do not respond to small increases in threat levels or
must respond dramatically by raising the threat level. Likewise, when reporting
taxes, citizens generally need only communicate the "boundaries" of their yearly
gains and losses. Only during an audit does the government examine the full
details of an individual's finances. Some commonplace non-property
communications are also mass communications, such as communicating marital
status, which is traditionally limited to a menu: "single," "married," "divorced,"
and "widow/widower." Expanding that menu may entail increased
communication costs, but refusal to do so may similarly increase communication
costs if the typical menu ineffectively maps onto society.
These examples show that the techniques for reducing communication costs
about property are generally effective means of promoting efficient mass
communication. To promote efficiency, the content of mass communications
should be reduced to the bare essentials so that it can be conveyed in clear
messages that are cheaper and more effective than complicated ones.232 Mass
communication costs may be large because the participants are numerous.
However, efficiency gains can be similarly large-small savings per person may
be magnified into significant reductions in overall communication costs.
Moreover, because many parties are involved in mass communications, costs can
often be substantially amortized to reduce overall costs. To promote efficiency,
the burdens in mass communication should be allocated to limit inefficient
externalization and to encourage parties to use communication advantages. With
mass communications, it may be difficult to efficiently prevent externalization
231. President George W. Bush established the Homeland Security Advisory System "to provide a
comprehensive and effective means to disseminate information regarding the risk of terrorist acts to
Federal, State, and local authorities and to the American people." Press Release, White House Office of
the Press Secretary, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-3 (March 2002),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20O20312-5.html; see also 33 C.F.R. § 101.205
(2003) (coordinating maritime security with the Homeland Security Advisory System).
232. Cf Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L.
REv. 773, 779 (2001) (comparing property communications with the comparatively personal
communications involved in contracts).
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because the externalized costs may be spread over a great many people and thus
may be hard to measure. As a result, externalization can best be avoided by
threatening to sanction a potentially externalizing party, perhaps by threatening to
transfer the benefits of the communication to a party less likely to externalize
communication costs in the future.
